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abstract MONTEREY CA Sv#43-5101
Fearful of large refugee flows, and the possible
spillover of ethnic violence into other Balkan countries,
the international community has become increasingly
involved in trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement in
the Kosovo crisis. Thus far, however, the lack of
international community resolve to present a common
position, and the intransigence of both the Serbian and
Kosovar parties, has enabled the belligerent leaders to
manipulate the situation.
This thesis will explore Serbian and Kosovar
historical national identities and their development, and
the modern nationalist movements in the region and their
leaders. Finally, the utility of the current leaders and
levers that may be used by the international community to
pressure or influence them will be evaluated. Presenting
policy options and analysis for conflict resolution without
the use of peacekeeping military forces, this thesis
highlights the most feasible options which allow for U.S.
and international community involvement, while enabling the
Serbs and Kosovars to solve the crisis in a way that is
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The recent outbreak of violence in the Kosovo region
between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians has caused the
international community to become increasingly involved in
trying to negotiate a peaceful settlement. The possibility
of the conflict expanding beyond the borders of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia threatens to destabilize the entire
Balkan peninsula and jeopardize U.S. leadership and NATO
alliance credibility in the region. After presenting the
dynamics of the parties' ethnic construction, this thesis
urges a more assertive U.S. role in an effort to shape the
conflict and provides policy options for conflict
resolution without the use of peacekeeping forces.
Tracing the historical national identity and
development, and the current nationalist movements of the
Serbs and the Kosovars, is imperative to understanding the
current ethno-national conflict in Kosovo. The Serbs,
having begun to develop a national identity in the 12 th
century, only to have it quashed by Ottoman Turk
domination, developed a national identity and history that
was primarily protected by the Orthodox church. Distorted
facts and mythologies of Serbian history were evoked during
the Serbian nationalist movement of the 19 th century, many
ix
of which surrounded Kosovo and the conflict between Serbs
and Muslims. The inadequacy of Yugoslav governments during
the inter-war years and World War II, and lack of
international community commitment to the region, further
served to exacerbate ethnic and religious animosity and
stereotypes in the region.
Using his position as the communist party leader of
Yugoslavia, and playing on the people's fears, Slobodan
Milosevic maneuvered his way into power in the 1980's.
With the help of the Serbian media and the Yugoslav army,
Milosevic started a nationalist war in the Former
Yugoslavia based primarily on manipulated "ancient ethnic
hatreds"
.
While Milosevic has been able, in may cases, to
outmaneuver the international community, several years of
war and economic sanctions have begun to take their toll on
his country. His power base is slowly eroding, and the
Kosovo conflict has once again focused the attention of the
international community on his repressive regime. As in
the past, when he senses that he may be losing power,
Milosevic may become more malleable to international
community demands.
The Kosovars, in contrast to the Serbs, did not
develop a national identity until the late 19 th century.
Foreign domination, clan structures, and geographical
limitations kept the Albanians from forming any cultural
homogeneity or political power.
Achieving independence after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire, Kosovo's independence was short lived. Continually
subjugated to Yugoslav or communist rule since World War I,
with a only a brief period during World War II under which
they belonged to a Greater Albania, the Kosovars have
retained a national identity and continually caused
problems for the governments by which they have been
subjugated. Repressed by most of the governments, the
Kosovars under Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution were allowed
to become an autonomous province and hold influence within
the communist government. The revocation of this status by
Milosevic in 1989, and repressive measures aimed at the
Kosovars since then, have caused the Kosovars to develop a
parallel government and institutions. Since 1989, the
Democratic League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, has
advocated passive resistance to the Milosevic regime in




However, Rugova's ineffectiveness in achieving
results, compounded by the lack of support from the
international community as evidenced by not addressing the
Kosovo issue at the Dayton Accords, has led to the
formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Having waged
limited attacks in previous years, the KLA in December 1998
began an offensive against Serb forces. Armed with rifles
that came from Albania after the fall of the government and
loss of control of military facilities in 1996, the KLA has
waged an effective guerrilla war against the Serbs. The
violence, atrocities, and human rights violations have
focused the international community's attention on Kosovo.
While the U.S. has been involved in the conflict
resolution process, Milosevic has continued to manipulate
the situation and use repressive tactics for over nine
months and for the most part, achieving his goals. When
the U.S. has taken the lead with military threats,
Milosevic has been willing to listen to demands.
Milosevic's current political and economic weaknesses
can be exploited by the international community to coincide
with military threats. Using financial levers that will
impact his patronage network and control of the media
should make him willing to negotiate. Using the financial
xii
lever against the LDK will also moderate their stance, and
empower the moderate leadership over the more radical KLA.
Suggesting several options for conflict resolution,
this thesis analyzes each, and prescribes the "autonomy"
option, as being the best for both parties and the
international community. Employing leverage at the proper
time and place is critical for making the Serb and Kosovar
leaders feel that they are losing power and bring them to
the negotiating table. While the autonomy option is a
short to medium term fix for crisis resolution, confidence
building measures will need to be put in place in order for
the Serbs and Kosovars to build the necessary trust between





Within every fruitful solution in the
Balkans, there are the seeds of a larger
intractable problem. 1
A. RESEARCH QUESTION
In light of the recent outbreak of violence in the
Kosovo region, the international community has become
increasingly involved in trying to negotiate a peaceful
settlement between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
parties. This thesis will explore the short and long-term
outlook for the Kosovo region — the most intractable of all
the political conflicts of the Balkans
.
In the short-term, the international community is
concerned that the current Kosovo situation will explode,
causing problems both inside, and more importantly, outside
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) borders with the
possibility of destabilizing the entire Balkan peninsula.
The way the current situation is handled, however, will in
the long-term determine whether the Kosovo question can be
solved in a way amenable to both sides, whether the
situation degenerates into a low intensity guerrilla war,
or whether it sparks a war that could involve other
1 Jaque Grinberg, Political Analyst for the United Nations
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, interview by author;
Vukovar, Croatia; 16 October 1996.
1
nations, including the pitting of one NATO ally against
another
.
Ethno-nationalism has been increasing, especially with
the fall of the Soviet Union, and has become a growing
threat to the political stability of many states. Walker
Conner believes that,
Rather than witnessing an evolution of stable
state or suprastate communities, the observer of
global politics has viewed a succession of
situations involving competing allegiances in
which people have illustrated that an intuitive
bond felt toward an informal and unstructured
subdivision of humankind is far more profound and
potent than are the ties that bind them to the
formal and legalistic state structure in which
they find themselves. 2
He cites several third world instances, which
amply testify to the widespread failure of governments to
induce a substantial segment of their citizenry to transfer
their primary loyalty from a human grouping to the state.
While believing that common kinship, homeland, and "shared
blood" are factors in ethno-nationalism, ultimately what
matters is not "what is" but "what people believe is.
"
History and other facts may not prove common kinship
or ethnic unity, but what is perceived by the people, their
2 Walker Conner, A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic
Group, is a ..., Ethnic and Racial Studies 1, Routledge Journals (October
1987) : 377.
2
mythically unfactual history, may be more believable. It
is with this overlying principal in mind, that global
leaders should be concerned with the events in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and now Kosovo . Understanding the underlying
histories, myths, and perceptions of the Kosovo question
are essential for finding a peaceful resolution to the
conflict
.
The Kosovo question is political. The tensions and
conflicts in the area have been created and exacerbated by
nationalist political leaders, namely Slobodan Milosevic
and Ibrahim Rugova . The Kosovo question is similar to the
Bosnia-Herzegovina problem in that religion and ethnicity
have themselves not been the causes for war. The cultural
mythology and propaganda of "ancient ethnic hatreds,
"
"ethnic kinship," and ties to the land, exuded by recent
political leaders in the region have brought these ethno-
national issues to the forefront in an effort to promote
their nationalist aims.
While the end-state for the United States and the
international community will remain the same — stop the
killing, but above all contain the problem — solutions to
the Kosovo problem will involve different considerations
from those applied to the Bosnia-Herzegovina case. Bosnia-
Herzegovina was a geopolitical entity which had enjoyed an
almost continuous history, during which three different
ethnicities continually lived and intermingled together.
Kosovo, by contrast, is characterized by two parties
(Serbians and Kosovars) that have a fractured history,
neither of which can claim extended historical possession
of the area. While Bosnian lands were populated with
different ethnicities, Kosovo is largely ethnically
homogenous. While this state of affairs is neither a
necessary nor sufficient reason for statehood, it has in
fact been treated as a natural starting point for many
modern states. 3 Kosovo is also different because one of the
parties now involved, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
,
calls for a "Greater Albania" and extension beyond the
established, modern geographic boundaries in the area.
This is a clear declaration for other ethnic Albanians in
neighboring countries, specifically Albania, Greece,
Bulgaria, and Macedonia, to unite in this nationalist
movement
.
3 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York
University Press, 1998), xxxiii.
B. RELEVANCE FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
Five-and-half years ago, during the height of the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President George Bush warned Serbian
President Milosevic via cable, that in the event of
conflict in Kosovo, the United States would use military-
force against the Serbs. When asked if President Bush's
"Christmas Warning" of 1992 was still in effect under the
Clinton Administration with respect to the latest fighting
in the Kosovo region, Special Envoy Richard Gelbard said,
"U.S. policy has not changed... we have warned Milosevic
appropriately." 4 This warning can also be found in U.S.
House of Representatives Resolution 4115, the Kosovo Peace
and Democracy Act of 19 94, which specifically warns Serbia
that the United States will not tolerate the expansion of
the conflict in Kosovo. However, the intent of the
resolution of late, has not been followed by the United
States government as is evidenced by the lifting of
sanctions against Serbia without them complying with the
conditions of the resolution stipulated as:
• There is substantial progress toward restoration of
Kosovo's independent identity.
4 International Crisis Group, Kosovo Spring, accessed
30 March 1998; available from http: //www. intl-crisis-
group. org/projects/kosovo/reports/kosrep2a .html ; Internet
.
• There is substantial improvement in the human rights
situation in Kosovo.




Having already invested millions of dollars and
valuable military resources in building peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, though, the United States and NATO is
determined to maintain regional stability both to give the
1995 Dayton peace process a chance of success, and to
eliminate the need for another costly reconstruction
program in the Balkans. In an effort to shape and contain
the crisis, the United States has told both sides that
their ultimate goals 'will not be supported. Secretary of
State Albright has said that,
We are not going to stand by and watch the
Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no
longer get away with doing in Bosnia... the time to
stop the killing is now, before it spreads. 6
On the other hand, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke has stated,
Kosovo is not Bosnia. It is not an
independent country, and the international
community cannot support the desire of the people,
no matter how heartfelt, to be independent...
Although I have total sympathy for their goals, if
they were to achieve them by force, as they are
' U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Situation in Kosovo,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103 rd Congress, 2 nd session, 5 October
1994, 62.
6 ICG, Kosovo Spring.
now seeking to do, they would create a general war
in the region. 7
Several leaders and factions within Kosovo have called
for a "Greater Albania, " which would include Albania,
Kosovo, and Western Macedonia. Many countries and
institutions, including the United States 8 , Greece 9 , and
NATO 10 , have opposed such thinking. With the possibility of
a new war based on nationalist driven "ethnic and
religious" issues, large refugee flows and war crimes would
be the norm. Expansion of the conflict could not only
threaten United States interests and international efforts
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also start a fourth Balkan war
that would jeopardize American leadership in NATO and
alliance credibility.
7 NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, Interview with Richard Holbrooke,
accessed 7 July 1998; available from http://www.pbs.org; Internet.
3 Tanjug News Agency, Washington Opposes Greater Albania, accessed
21 July 1998; available from http://www.yugoslavia.com; Internet.
9 Tanjug News Agency, Greece Warns Against Kosovo ' s Union with
Albania, accessed 21 July 1998; available from
http : / /www
.
Yugoslavia . com; Internet
.
10 Tanjug News Agency, Solana: NATO Opposes Greater Albania,
accessed 21 July 1998; available from http://www.yugoslavia.coin;
Internet
.
As the Contact Group called for the parties to resume
negotiations after their 8 July 1998 meeting11 , and the 21
October 1998 agreement brokered between Richard Holbrooke
and the parties for Serb troop withdrawal from the region,
it remains critical that the international community and
the United States continue to be actively engaged in
negotiations to bring about a peaceful solution to the
crisis. A durable solution to this political crisis can
only be found if incentives are provided, and pressure is
maintained on the parties to negotiate in good faith and
without pre-conditions.
With this goal in mind, it is imperative that there is
a thorough understanding of Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
history and nationalist development. The next chapter will
address these issues, which will then be followed by the
current situation. Finally, possible solutions will be
offered.
11 USIA Washington File, Pentagon Background Briefing on Kosovo,
accessed 20 July 1998; available from
h"p: //www. usia
.
gov/current /news /topic . html ; Internet
.
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II. NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND DEVELOPMENT
A. SERBIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT
The religious sentiment of the Serbians is neither
deep nor warm. Their churches are generally
empty, except on very great Church festivals, and
on political festivals. The Serbians of our day
consider the Church as a political institution,
in some mysterious manner connected with the
existence of the nation. They do not allow anyone
to attack her, although, when she is not attacked,
they neglect her. 12
Serbians, as well as other southern Slavs, manifested
little sense of cultural homogeneity or political power
prior to the early 19 th century. Before this time, the
different ethnicities of the area knew little about each
other, much less themselves. These ethnicities had little
contact with each other due primarily to their continual
subjugation to foreign rulers that kept them isolated,
divided, and misinformed. 1
However, there can be found several attributes
throughout history common to the Serbians that led to
their group identity and later, ethnic unity and
nationalist movements . These attributes of Serbian
12 Malcolm, 14.
13 Peter F. Sugar, ed., Eastern European Nationalism in the
Twentieth Century (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press,
1995), 398.
national identity, primarily language, historical myths,
and religion, galvanized into a nationalist movement and
ideology in the early and middle 19 th century leading to
Serb autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 1829, and in the
1870 's with the creation of a monarchy at the end of the
Ottoman Empire.
The Serb Orthodox religion, probably the most
influential attribute of Serbian culture, was founded in
the 12 th century when the first ruler of a somewhat unified
south Slav region, Nemanjic, took the Orthodox religion
after being held captive by Emperor Manuel in Byzantine
Constantinople 14 . The religion was further developed and
spread throughout the Kingdom by the ruler's son and
successor, Saint Sava . Eventually becoming the head of the
new national church, Sava combined the idea of church and
state, and in the process founded the beginnings of Serbian
national identity and statehood. In 1345, a Serb










The Orthodox Church has been the one constant
throughout Serb history, which prior to the 19 th century,
had seen almost continual subjugation to foreign
imperialist powers with the exception of the two
centuries (12 th and 13 th ) under Nemanjic rule. While
there was no written Slav history to speak of, the
Serbian Orthodox church was always allowed to exist,
even during Ottoman Turk rule, and it became the protector
of the people and symbol of the only vestige of a glorious
time when there was a "Slav" state. In this respect, the
early contribution of Sava to the state and the church
cannot be overstated. His canonization gave the Serbian
people a saint who had come from their ranks, and would
forever be perceived as the protector of the people. 16
It was primarily the church in the 19 th century that
gave birth to Serb consciousness of who they were, largely
by invoking distorted historical facts of events. The most
important of which was the battle of Kosovo Polje in 13 89,
when the Ottoman Turks killed the Serbian leader, Lazar
.
In the view of Serb history, the death of Lazar marked the
end of Serb independence 17 , and that their loss was due to a
16 Ibid. , 26.
17 Michael A. Sells, The Bridge Betrayed (Berkeley, CA:
11
treacherous act by one of their own. This mythology was
the basis for two unsuccessful revolts in 1689 and 1730 by
Patriarch Arsenije Carnojevic which led to a mass exodus of
Serb peasants and left unprotected many of the religious
shrines of the Orthodox church and birthplace of Serbian
culture in the Serbian heartland — the Kosovo area.
However, these revolts to Ottoman rule could hardly be
characterized as nationalist movements — they were
localized insurrections and did not mobilize "all Serbs."
Between 1790 and 1815 though, Serb nationalism grew
with the increased power and wealth of the Habsburg Empire,
the increased Russian imperialist involvement in the area,
and the decay of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Turks
began to intensify their oppression of the Serbs with
increased taxes and religious persecution. Inspired and
cajoled by Austrian Serbs, the Ottoman Serb peasants, led
by intellectuals, revolted in 1804. Their demands were
eventually met by a weak Ottoman regime and the Serbs
received an autonomous province. This interaction between
Austrian and Ottoman Serbs was critical in forming a sense
of "common kinship."
University of California Press, 1996), 31.
12
This feeling of ethnic cross-border community was
fostered in large part due to Serbian nationalist writers
and artists of the 19 th century that seized on the Prince
Lazar mythology. They portrayed in their writings and
paintings Lazar as a Christ figure who was betrayed by a
Judas. Vuk Brankovic, the Serb who betrayed the cause at
Kosovo Polje, becomes the Judas and represents the Serbs
that converted to Islam. This epic represented not only
the death of prior Serb independence, but also that the
descendants of Lazar 's killers (Muslims) had to be purged
from what could only be Serbian lands. 18 This mythology is
also reflected in the Serb national anthem that has existed
since the 19 th century. The anthem extols of how their
"grandfather's word still lives," and that any "traitor of
the homeland be damned." 19
The most prominent Serb writer in the 18 th and 19 th
centuries, and author of the above epic, was Vuk Karadzic.
His production of folk literature, songs and epics became a
voice of the national spirit. He even created a reformed
spoken and written (Cyrillic) language that was supposedly
18 Ibid.
19 William L. Reed, ed., National Anthems of the World
(London: Villiers House, 1993), 548.
13
free of "foreign contamination." 20 Those that spoke this
Serb language would always be Serbs, regardless of borders.
These legends, writings, songs and poems, became a part of
the Serb revolutionary.
These mythologies were later expanded upon after
autonomy was granted in 1829, and helped consolidate
nationalist pride. The most important of the post autonomy
mythological literature was the "Mountain Wreath" by Bishop
Njegos in 1847, which glorified the extermination of
Muslims by Serb warriors that would not be baptized in the
Orthodox religion after the battle of Kosovo Polje. It is
a story of good over evil, and race betrayal. 21
After autonomy was granted in 182 9, schools began to
be developed, and political parties were formed and grew
stronger. In the latter half of the century, after the
demise of the Ottoman Empire, Serb nationalism intensified
when the government called for sovereignty, a Balkan
leadership role, and territorial expansion into Serbian
homelands (primarily Kosovo and the Sandzak areas, now




Serbian government and people looked upon themselves as
being a nation. 22
After the Central Powers defeat in World War I,
seventy years of Yugoslavism followed. Under the Kingdom
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Yugoslavism was complicated
by ethicities and religions in the newly formed country.
The newly formed political parties, led mostly by middle
class intellectuals and workers, had their beliefs and
political programs closely tied to these ethnic and
religious divisions. There was a constant struggle between
these groups, sometimes leading to violence. The young,
inexperienced government continually found it difficult to
reconcile the contradictory demands made upon it by the
various ethnic and religious groups. 23
Although these parties did "govern" the state for much
of the inter-war period, their actions and progress could
hardly be called conducive to nation building. The
response of the inter-war regime was to centralize power in
order to contain these divisive forces. "No tradition of
compromise and accommodation of differences was bequeathed
22 Sugar, 407.
23 M. George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 17.
15
to the young Yugoslav system. While the government
possessed the instruments of force, it lacked the
confidence and legitimacy to achieve results without it." 24
The ineffectiveness of the government during this
period was largely due to the way in which the government
was set up. It was founded largely on pre-existing Serbian
government institutions. The Serbs were rightly or wrongly
perceived by other ethnic groups as being dominant in the
system, and exploiting the other groups. While the Serbs
were more industrialized and involved in government, the
rest of the country was agricultural and peasant oriented.
This bred chronic distrust of both the Serbs and central
authority. 25
In 1931, King Alexander banned all parties under a new
constitution in an effort to rid Yugoslavian politics of
"tribalism." His newly created regency (a coalition
government) attempted to govern until 1934, when Alexander
was assassinated. However, all they did was further
alienate the peasant movements (mostly in the south) , and




religion based parties re-emerged and continued until the
beginning of World War II.
As can be seen, the inter-war years were characterized
by a monarchy that was unable to create a common belief
system for all of the ethnicities. The Communists
gradually gained support from non-Serb and non-Croat
ethnicities, mostly to give them a political voice in
government against the other ethnically based parties. In
193 8, the Communist Party changed from being organized
along ethnic and religious lines to being a party that
embraced Yugoslavism, including some Serb and Croat
peasants, many of which were tired of government
inefficiency and ethnic strife. Although they were not
able to start an effective or articulate movement along
these lines prior to World War II, a political ideology and
a streamlined, dedicated leadership was effected that would
see the Communist Party through the difficult early war
years of World War II.
The Axis occupation of World War II imposed a brutal
peace on Yugoslavia, a perfect setting for revolutionary
struggle. 26 The Ustache movement with its ethnic hatred and
26 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, The Improbable Survivor: Yugoslavia
and its Problems, 1918-1988 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press,
1988), 14.
17
Axis affiliation, and the Chetnik movement with its
inactivity typical of the regime in which they represented,
enabled the Communists to win the support of a significant
part of the population. The old elites, who were at first
demoralized and divided, were eventually destroyed by both
the Nazi's and during the course of the civil war. As the
Germans withdrew, the Communists were able to rapidly fill
the power vacuum
.
The Axis powers, by conquering Yugoslavia, had not
only destroyed the state, but set its ethnic components
against each other. Never had there been an internal
struggle of such violence. Tito, out of the ruin of ethnic
warfare among Yugoslavs and occupation by foreign forces,
was able to place a patriotic, nationalist movement in the
service of world Communism by destroying all the forces
that opposed the transformation of the war of liberation. 27
By organizing minorities, western Serbs, and giving
Croats a way out from a sinking Nazi ship, Tito had control
over a large part of the population that he wished to
transform into one nation. By downplaying ethnic
rivalries, he called the people's attention to their common
27 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito: A Reassessment (London: C. Hearst
and Company, 1992), 48.
18
service during the war years and the future vision under
Communist ideology.
Internally, Tito also made concessions to the people
of Yugoslavia. While continuing purges of radical elements
and competitors, he continued to try to win the support of
the people as evidenced by the 1946 constitution. In it,
federalism was provided for with the establishment of six
republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Slovenia) and two autonomous territories
(Vojvodina and Kosovo) . These boundaries were largely
drawn along ethnic lines. Tito envisioned that ethnic
based issues would melt away as Communism took hold in
Yugoslavia, much the way it was perceived to have been done
in Russia during the 1920's. As we will see in the next
chapter, Tito was never able to abolish the political
ideologies that were directly related to ethnicity that had
been developed during the inter-war years and World War II
.
The Yugoslav experiment was held together largely due to
his autocratic style of government. The experiment may
have worked had there been another leader of Tito's stature
and power after his death, allowing for more time to
develop a Yugoslav national identity among the people.
However, the power vacuum that resulted after his death,
19
showed that Yugoslav citizenship, for the most part, never
became co-equal with Yugoslav nationality. Emotional
loyalties to "homeland, " religion, and history, were not
completely broken, especially where the Kosovars were
concerned. "Yugoslavia was a mosaic, not a melting pot." 28
B. KOSOVAR NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEVELOPMENT
The Albanians, like the Slavs of the Balkan
Peninsula, had little cultural homogeneity or political
power prior to the 1800' s. Albania's geography made
communication difficult and favored small local units and
their autonomous development. Albanian language, customs,
social organizations, and traditions had little if anything
in common with their Slav or Greek neighbors. 29
Albania, as well as the Kosovo area, consisted of clan
structures, along with several different religions
(Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim) , which further served to
isolate them from the outside world as well as each other.
However, many inhabitants of the area converted to Islam;
in Kosovo by 1459 when that part of Serbia was conquered by
28 Sugar, 432.
29 Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer, ed. , Nationalism in
Eastern Europe (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1994), 55
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the Ottoman Empire, and in 1468 in what is modern day
Albania after the death of Skenderbeg, an Albanian leader
who formed the first "league" in the area in order to unite
the different clans in a common defense against the Ottoman
Turks . 30
The Albanians and Kosovars played a significant role
in the Ottoman Empire. Viziers and pasas (local lords and
governors), and military commanders of Albanian descent,
figured prominently in Ottoman administration of conquered
lands and its society. However, these local leaders also
developed their own land-owning, feudal, administrative
aristocracy that practically ruled Albanian lands,
resulting in the Albanians in many cases being able to
defend their rights and privileges against most Ottoman
demands
.
In the 18 th and 19 th centuries, Ottoman rule declined
and local Albanian governors began to assert themselves
.
There was no unity among the Albanian aristocracy since
Skenderbeg, and at lower levels, clan leaders also differed
in their views . Corruption and high taxes became the norm
30 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia 's Bloody Collapse: Causes,
Course, and Consequences (London: Hurst and Company, 1995), 18.
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and the Ottoman Empire was unable to control it. 31 It is at
this time, in the early 19 th century, that the Albanians
began to form their nationalist beliefs.
It wasn't until the 1870 's, however, that the
Albanians were able to start their first concerted national
movement. It was much later than Western Europe because
they had to overcome serious linguistic, religious, and
regional differences. The leaders of Albania in the early
1800 's couldn't make up their minds if they were dynasts or
Muslim dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire.
The formation of the League of Prizren, a combination
of middle class, worker, and intellectual, political
committees from the region, met in June 1878. United in an
effort to stop Montenegro from annexing Muslim lands as
part of the Treaty of San Stefano, the movement called for
greater unity among Albanians, regardless of their
religion, clan, or pasa.
Informing the Congress of Berlin in 1878 of their
national and territorial rights and ambitions, Bismark
dismissed the League's appeal and denied that an Albanian
nation existed. When the Montenegrins tried to occupy the
region allotted to them, however, they were defeated in
31 Sugar and Lederer, 56
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battle by forces under the Ali Pasa of Gusinje. While the
outside world at this time viewed the League as an
instrument of the Ottoman Empire used in an effort to
prolong their retreat from the area, the reality was that
it had become a national organization which was willing if
necessary to fight the Ottomans or any other group that
tried to invade their lands. In 1881, however, the
Ottomans sent an army to Albania and arrested all of the
local leaders because they had become too powerful and were
making too many demands
.
32
The work of the Albanian League had lasting effects
despite their defeat . The League helped protect the
territorial integrity of the new nation, and brought the
existence of an Albanian nation to the attention of the
Great Powers. It was the first sign of nationalism in
Albania while stressing ethnic unity, minimizing religious
differences, and creating a unified language.
The nationalist leaders were less sanguine however.
They strongly believed that the external conditions of the
region during the last quarter of the century were not
favorable for achieving full independence. In July 1908
they got their wish. A revolt in the Ottoman Empire forced
32 Ibid. , 62.
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the Sultan to restore the Constitution of 1876 which would
transform the Empire into a commonwealth where each
nationality would enjoy full political and religious
equality and right of self-government. Albanian
nationalists in Kosovo organized mass demonstrations in
favor of the program because it promised them, by peaceful
means, the type of self-government within the Ottoman
Empire that they had wanted for thirty years. When this
was not implemented however, a revolt began in Kosovo under
Hassan Prishtina. Lasting from 1909-1912, the Ottoman
Empire eventually gave in to their demands whereby all of
their requests would be submitted to Qamil Pasa as Grand
Vizier of the region. Unfortunately, Albania's autonomous
status was short lived as an alliance of Balkan states went
to war and removed the Ottoman Empire from Albania,
Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Sandzak. The settlement after
the first Balkan War, the 1913 London Conference of
Ambassadors, recognized Albania but gave more than half of
Albanian-inhabited territory, including Kosovo, to the new
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, while over 800,000
Albanians were left beyond the country's borders. 3
Ibid., 69-73.
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With the return of the "cradle of the Serb nation" to
Serbia, Serbia considered the Albanians in Kosovo as
undesirable foreigners. They were subjected to a
deliberate policy of forced assimilation and
denationalization, expulsion from their lands, and gross
and systematic violation of their human and national
rights. 34 Albanians were forced to change their language,
their names , and land was taken from them to give to Serb
and Montenegrin settlers. It is estimated that prior to
1941, over 500,000 Albanians were forced to emigrate from
what was now "Yugoslavia," and that approximately 40,000
Serb colonists were settled in the area. 3 ' Two separate
communities immediately formed: that of the relatively
prosperous and modern Serb settlers, and primitive,
uncompetitive and discriminated against Albanians.
Albania was able to annex Kosovo after 1941 due to the
help of Italian forces, and later German forces in 1943.
Albanians fought the Serbs, and later Tito's Communist
forces, and eventually composed three battalions in the
German army. Those Albanians that were communist, fought
34 Pavlowitch, Stevan K. and Elez Biberaj , The Albanian Problem in






with and against the Yugoslav communists. While trying to
rid the area of foreign forces, the Albanian communists
also did not want to play a second role to the Yugoslav
communists. By 1945, however, Tito's communists were
firmly in control of Kosovo.
It is at this time that the Albanians break off from
their close ties to the Kosovars . The Albanians quickly
distanced themselves from Tito's controversial form of
communism. For the next thirty- five years, Kosovars would
be able to realize their potential under a system that
downplayed ethnic agendas, yet created a confederation with
boundaries drawn along ethnic lines. With no help from
Albania, the Kosovars for the most part, would have to
struggle for the next twenty years to have the same rights
and privileges as other republics in Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav constitution of 1946 provided for the
multi-ethnic federation of six units, and two autonomous
regions, one of which was Kosovo. Tensions with Albania
and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo ensued for several years
after. Rankovic, Tito's security chief, maintained a large
portion of his security forces (SDB) in Kosovo through
1966, when he was deposed.
26
By 1968, with the Albanian population in Kosovo
reaching 67 percent, and repression and reforms being
implemented by the Communist leadership, revolts ensued in
Kosovo. Thousands gathered in the streets calling for an
independent university, the status of a full republic, and
union with Albania. After the revolt was put down, Tito
responded with more autonomy and economic aid for the
region. Constitutional amendments in 1968 gave the
autonomous provinces more influence. The government began
to put special emphasis on economic and cultural
development in the area — an independent university was
created and more Albanians were promoted to positions of
authority in the government and civilian sector. With
relations finally being normalized with Albania in 1971,
the Yugoslav government allowed books and teachers from
Albania to enter the region. 36
Constitutional changes in 1971 and 1974 led to further
autonomy for Kosovo in order to satisfy the growing and
discontented Kosovar population, which now composed 73.5
percent of the population as compared to only 18.3 percent
Serb. By 1981 however, conditions were right for another
large uprising. With the Albanian population now
36 Ibid. , 12
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comprising 77 percent of the 1.6 million population, and
Serbian population declining, not only relatively, but also
absolutely by 28,000, living standards and unemployment
began to become a factor. By 1981, approximately one-third
of the population was unemployed, and one-third were
students. 3 With little chance of finding work upon
graduation from school, the revolt was largely due to a new
generation of Kosovars whose aspirations could not be
fulfilled. The revolts were suppressed in about six months
with minimal loss of life. However, the region was sealed
off from Albania and education facilities were closed. 3.
With the death of Tito in 1980, the institution of a
form of government that could not come to a decision
largely due to policies being based along ethnic lines, and
severe economic problems, tensions in Kosovo would grow
throughout the decade. In 1989, out of the turmoil of
inefficient government based on ethnic priorities and
agendas, Serbian and Kosovar nationalists and national
movements would come to the forefront, plunging the Former
Yugoslavia into war.
37 Ibid. , 13 and 32
Ibid., 15.
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III. THE MODERN SERBIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Yugoslavia, during the late 1980 's and early 1990 's,
was destroyed for the sake of a "Greater Serbia." What
Serbian political leaders had not been able to achieve in
several Balkan wars and two World Wars, finally seemed
within reach. 39
Slobodan Milosevic, with his manipulation of Serbian
nationalism, rose to power in Serbian politics and became
the motive force in the disintegration of the Yugoslav
state. The role that this nationalist movement, the
Orthodox Church, the mythologies of Serbia's past, and the
Serbian media, played a prominent role in Yugoslavia's
disintegration that cannot be overstated.
Milosevic used the media to spread crude and distorted
interpretations of the past. With the help of political
leaders, the church, and nationalists, he was able to
nurture and sustain a nationalist movement based on ethnic
and religious hatred that served his political needs.
While much of his work toward the dissolution of the
Yugoslav state was done while he was the "number two" man
in Serbian politics (Chairman of the League of Communists)
,
35 Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, ed. , Why Bosnia (Stoney
Creek, CN: The Pamphleteer's Press, Inc., 1993), 251.
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it all culminated in 1989 with his rise to power as the
president of Serbia, which now also included the
former Yugoslav provinces of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and
Montenegro
.
Since the war in Bosnia has come to an end, however,
Milosevic's power base has eroded, the nationalist flames
that he stoked have cooled, and the country's economic
condition has continued to deteriorate. Never before has
his power been so limited.
A. MILOSEVIC'S RISE TO POWER
Considering the large diversity between Yugoslavia's
six republics, and two autonomous provinces, it is not
surprising how the country after Tito's death, gradually
fell into disrepair. - However, despite the fact that the
complicated eight-man government could rarely come to
common opinion on issues, Yugoslavia remained in a better
economic position than most countries of the former Soviet
Union. The liberal policies of Tito's Yugoslavia had
developed a large tourist industry, and modern heavy
industry. Yugoslavia was a food surplus nation that had
30
some of the most modern highways and infrastructure in the
world. 40 So why did it fall apart?
Milosevic rose to power on the coat tails of Ivan
Stambolic, until he became the Communist Party Chief in
Yugoslavia (Stambolic had become Serbian President) . Much
like Stalin, Milosevic over time, won the confidence and
loyalties of key members of the Party apparatus, and was
able to manipulate the system to place people loyal to him
in positions of power.
In 1986, he began stoking the nationalist flames after
the release of a controversial, private document. The
Memorandum as it became known, signed by Serbian
intellectuals and political leaders said,
In the general process of disintegration which
has encompassed Yugoslavia, the Serbs have been
hit the hardest... This process is directed toward
the total break up of the national unity among the
Serbian people.
It concluded that under Communist domination, a policy was
pursued calling for "a weak Serbia, a strong Yugoslavia"
which led to the Serb economy supporting smaller,
impoverished provinces, while they retained the same voting
power and influence in the government. It also concluded
that thousands of Serbians had been killed or raped in
40 Bennett, 1.
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Kosovo by Kosovo Albanians, and that the Tito regime was
inherently against the Serbs and the creation of a Greater
Serbia. 41
With the release of the Memorandum, the typically
ethnically liberal and progressive Serbian media assumed a
"war footing" and gradually began to push Serbian
nationalist rhetoric. Most of the ideas within the
Memorandum were false. For instance, there were less rapes
and murders between the ethnicities (Serbians and Kosovo
Albanians) than there were among the Serbian population in
the area. 42
Later, the Serbian media continued to spread distorted
facts of the events in Kosovo. A disturbed Albanian
soldier in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) early in 1987,
went on a shooting spree in his barracks that killed four
"Serbian" soldiers. The Serbian media continually reported
this event as such, when in reality, three of those killed
were of Croat and Muslim ethnicity. 43
41 Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York: Oxford
University. Press, 1996), 275-280.
42 Robert J. Donia and John V.A. Fine, Bosnia And Hercegovina: A
Tradition Betrayed (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 185.
43 Judah, 163.
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Using these reports, which had been enhanced and
manipulated by the communist party under Milosevic, and the
600 th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje as a reason
to go to Kosovo in 1987, signaled the turning point in
Milosevic's career. Continuing to manipulate the media
which he had gradually gained control of through the party
apparatus, he arrived in Kosovo for his epoch speech. He
had many of the Serbian complaints in the area dramatized
and exaggerated by the media prior to his visit. The local
Serbs talked of "genocide" by their Kosovo Albanian
neighbors and mass rapes of their women.
In a staged event, an elderly man approached Milosevic
as he was approaching the stage to give his speech. Filmed
by the media, with over 10,000 demonstrators in attendance,
the man complained of his and other Serbs plight in the
area to which Milosevic replied, "No one should dare to
beat you." It was also staged that the Orthodox patriarch
was at his side, thereby involving and invoking the church
in his nationalist rhetoric. In reality, the man
complaining of these events was from Nis, an area not even
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This rally, sparked many protests, most of which were
engineered (and paid for, including fees to the
demonstrators for lost work wages) by Milosevic and the
Communist Party, and placed increased importance on Kosovo
being the Serbian homeland that would never be given up.
With the deployment of over 2 5 percent of the JNA to the
area, protests by Kosovo Albanians for educational and
cultural autonomy were quickly suppressed with the use of
mass force, resulting in 140 Kosovo Albanian deaths. 45
Throughout 1988 and 1989, Milosevic's control of the
media aided in his ascendancy to power. Discrediting the
provincial governments of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro
as being ineffective, and with the use of planned
demonstrations, he used the "Greater Serbia" nationalist
theme and euphoria to cause the downfall of these
governments (Kosovo - 1988, Montenegro and Vojvodina -
1989) . The governments were reconstituted with Milosevic
supporters and party officials that he was allowed to
nominate as the communist party chief. 46
Milosevic's control of the media to spread nationalist
propaganda, and his control of the communist party which
45 Bennett, 95.
46 Joseph Rothschild, Return To Diversity (New York: Oxford
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enabled him to stage and pay for mass demonstrations, was
instrumental in him achieving total power. In late 1989,
Milosevic in a speech to the 14 th Communist Party Congress
out-maneuvered and deposed his former mentor as president
of Serbia. Citing Stambolic's ineffectiveness in
"protecting Serbian interests," and Milosevic's widespread
and well planned support by other prominent leaders, it was
a "fait acompli."
As Serbian president, Milosevic in 1990 changed the
constitution of Serbia, effectively annexing the three
provinces. However, by annexing these provinces and
therefore controlling four of the eight votes of the
Yugoslav presidency, led to stagnation of the government
and the creation of nationalist movements in other
provinces (Slovenia, Croatia, and Kosovo) that would
eventually lead to the first shots being fired in the third
Balkan war in 1991.
B. CURRENT SERBIAN ENVIRONMENT
Since the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995, the
Serbian political environment has changed dramatically. No
longer on a war footing, there has been a cooling of
University Press, 1993), 260.
35
nationalist passion. Milosevic's power base has begun to
erode, the people have become war weary, and he has had to
make alliances with even more extremist parties in order to
retain power. Also, the outer wall of economic sanctions
have continued to take their toll on the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia's economy, causing internal problems and
giving rise to a reform minded leader in the satellite
state of Montenegro.
Milosevic's power has been waning since the war in
Bosnia began. The reach of his patronage network, once
stretching into Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro, has been
lost or is in turmoil. The strength of Milosevic's
position, the army, police, and media, is directly linked
to his control of monetary resources, which are now running
low. With the "outer wall" of economic sanctions still in
place, the FRY has since 1992 been excluded from both the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. This has
cut the country off from normal capital flows.
No longer "threatened" by outside forces as portrayed
by the Milosevic controlled media during the war years, the
people of the FRY have seen their country's industrial
output decrease to forty percent of that in 1989, and
average monthly wages decrease to 125 dollars. With
36
unemployment near forty percent, and corruption and black
marketeering on the rise, Milosevic's political popularity
has never been lower. 47
In order to recover from the November 1996 elections,
during which Milosevic and his closely allied parties
(namely the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) , which is run by his
wife) succeeded in winning only 110 of the 250 seats in the
Serbian parliament, Milosevic has had to form a coalition.
Choosing the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Sesel j
,
Milosevic gained another 82 votes in the parliament, at the
expense of now having to deal with the most ardent
nationalist in Serbian politics. It should be remembered
that Sesel j , along with the notorious para-military leader
Arkan, helped ethnically cleanse large portions of
northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. 48
However, despite Milosevic's coalition, he still only
controls what is estimated to be about thirty percent of
the popular vote; mostly vocal, hard-line nationalists.
47 Stephen Hedges, The Looting of Yugoslavia, US News and World
Report, 21 July 1997, 39.
48 International Crisis Group, Serbia: The Milosevic Factor,
accessed 30 March 1998; available from http: //www.irsfcl-crisis-
group. org/projects/yugo/reports/yuO lrep.html ; Internet.
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Milosevic, also, does not control many of the municipal
districts, including the Belgrade district.
During this same period, the prime minister of
Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, broke ranks with Milosevic and
criticized him for the FRY's isolation and economic woes.
Running against Momir Bulatovic , a Milosevic supporter and
ally, Djukanovic defeated him in the 1997 presidential
election. Djukanovic since then, has tried to create
democratic institutions and distance Montenegro from
Serbia, while at the same time not provoking the Serbian
leadership. It is clear, however, that Milosevic's power






IV. THE MODERN KOSOVAR NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
There has been significant growth in political
activism by Kosovo Albanians since they were stripped of
their provincial autonomy in 1989. Since then, a new
parallel Kosovar society has emerged within the province
which exists almost completely outside the Serbian state.
The Kosovo Albanians have traveled a long, hard road since
1989, and are now at the crossroads — never before has
their plight been so illuminated to the international
community, never have they been better equipped militarily
due to the influx of weaponry from Albania during the
government's recent collapse, and never before have their
goals been so high - complete independence from Serbia, as
opposed to restoration of republic or autonomous province
status. Yet, at a time when political unity is necessary,
the Kosovo Albanian political movement has become
fractured. This may lead to a continuation of the conflict
and reduction of international community support as the
movement becomes more militant.
The two sides view the current status of Kosovo very
differently. The Serb view is that Kosovo is a part of
Serbia. As such, they have no right to self-determination
or succession, and that any form of independence would lead
39
to Kosovars uniting with Albania. Consequently, Kosovars
must renounce secession in advance of any political
agreement
.
The Kosovar view is that they have declared themselves
independent and that it is only a matter of getting the
international community to transform this into reality. As
President Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK) said in March of 1998,
Former Yugoslavia has ceased to exist. Kosovo
has its own borders and we have not asked for a
change in borders. Perhaps Serbia does not think
that way but an independent Kosovo is a good thing
for Serbia. 50
A. THE RISE OF THE LDK
On 23 March 1989, the provincial assembly of Kosovo,
surrounded by Serbian tanks and armored vehicles, voted in
favor of accepting several amendments of the Serbian
constitution that would severely restrict Kosovo's power.
In doing so, Kosovars gave Serbia control over their
courts, police, civil defense, social and economic policy,
and education. Throughout the first six months of 1990,
the Serbs passed measures aimed at further reducing Kosovo
Albanian political power — creating new municipalities for
50 ICG, Kosovo Spring.
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Serbs in the region, annulling sales of property by Serbs
to Albanians in an effort to force Serbs to stay in the
region, and closing Albanian language newspapers and
schools
.
In mid-July 1990, Albanian members of the parliament
met in the streets and voted overwhelmingly to declare
Kosovo "an equal and independent entity within the
framework of the Yugoslav federation." With this
announcement, the Serbian authorities dissolved the
parliament and removed the last vestige of Kosovo's
autonomous status. Three weeks later, the Serbian Assembly
passed a law on labor relations in Kosovo and expelled more
than 80,000 Albanian workers from their jobs. Subsequent
protests by Kosovo Albanians were then used as a pretext to
send in several more units of the Serbian Army and 25,000
policemen from Serbia to the province. 51
By September 199 0, Kosovo Albanian delegates met and
passed a proclamation of a constitutional law for a
"Republic of Kosovo, " a document which provided for a new
assembly and presidency. All other laws made by Serbia it
declared, would be valid only if they were in harmony with
their new constitution. On May 24, 1992, elections were
51 Malcolm, 343-346.
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held at polling stations in private houses throughout the
region and a new government (both assembly and president)
were elected. 52
Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the LDK since 1989, was
elected president. The basic policy of Rugova since 1990
has been to prevent violent revolt, to internationalize the
Kosovo Albanian problem, and to deny the legitimacy of
Serbian rule by boycotting elections and other state
functions while nurturing the parallel state apparatus of
the "Kosovo Republic."
The first of these aims has been successful in its
implementation. The clan-like structure of families in the
area, inherited from the Ghegs of northern Albania of which
most Kosovars are ancestors, has helped in keeping others
who may wish to use more violent means under the control of
clan leaders and the LDK party's aims. The second and
third aims are directed against the idea that the Kosovo
problem is an internal question for Serbia. This idea is
very much alive, as evidenced by the Dayton Accords and the
lack of addressal of the Kosovo problem within it. By
Ibid., 347.
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setting up a parallel government and other structures, the
Kosovo Albanians have
Engaged in a strategy of political "as if"
.
To behave as if Kosovo were not part of Serbia
might seem, in the short term, sheer make-believe;
but if the strategy continued long enough, foreign
governments might feel obliged to admit that they
were the ones engaging in fiction when they
continued to treat Kosovo as a mere region of the
Serbian state. 53
While the Serb government sacked most Albanian workers
that worked in government positions in 1990, and also over
6,000 teachers that participated in protests or failed to
comply with a newly instituted Serbian curriculum, some
have found employment in the parallel system of clinics and
schools . They are paid by the LDK from a voluntary three
percent income tax that is levied from the diaspora, which
is approximately 350,000 strong with over four million
Albanian sympathizers in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Greece. 54 Most people that work within this parallel
structure however, are more likely and frequently subjected
to arrest, intimidation and beatings by the Serb police.
In 1994 alone, the Council for Defense of Human Rights and
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police, 3,553 raids on private dwellings and 2,963
arbitrary arrests. 55
The outbreak of war in 1991 in Slovenia and Croatia
had a dramatic effect on the thinking of Kosovar leaders.
If other Yugoslav republics could secede from the Yugoslav
union, then they could also. The LDK changed its position
from attaining republic status within Yugoslavia, to full
sovereignty and independence.
The position of Kosovo Albanians during the war,
although not directly involved in the fighting, suffered
dramatically. With an economy greatly suffering from
economic sanctions, Kosovo would be the last place that
Serbia spent any of its money. 5 ' Compounding Kosovo's
economic problems was the implementation of the United
Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) along the
Macedonian border which was designed to prevent the Bosnian
war from spreading. However, it also had the effect of
cutting off all trade (most of it illegal) along the border
between Kosovo and Macedonia.
55 International Crisis Group, Milosevic: The Invisible Hand,





The end of the war brought no end to the crisis in
Kosovo and Rugova's prestige since then has been greatly
diminished. After spending four years telling his people
that they must be patient until the international community
imposed a beneficial settlement for them in relation to the
Former Yugoslavia and Serbia, the Kosovo problem was not
even addressed at the Dayton Accords in November of 1995.
Instead, the LDK saw the international community legitimize
the problem as being internal to Serbia, congratulate
Milosevic for his support and efforts at ending the war,
and that his presence in Yugoslavia led to stability in the
region
.
Rugova, since Dayton, has seen many of the levers that
the international community could pull to influence Serb
behavior in Kosovo rapidly disappear. First, Kosovo did
not obtain a regional solution to the problem. Second,
they saw a reduction in sanctions (all except the outer
wall of sanctions, which does not permit Serbia to be
involved or negotiate with the IMF and the World Bank) , and
thirdly, most of Europe has recognized the "third
Yugoslavia" and has not made any calls for Kosovar
independence. The only good thing to come out of Dayton
for the Kosovars, was that the peace settlement can be
45
interpreted as being based on the principle that statehood
in the Balkans derives from ethnicity, which could help
legitimize violent revolt in Kosovo in the future. 5
In 1996, President Rugova for the first time met with
Milosevic. Through the mediation of a Catholic charity,
the two sides signed an agreement under which schools and
university buildings would be made available to the
parallel Albanian education system and that their language
could be used in the schools. This agreement has, in fact,
never been implemented by the Serbs, and further undermined
Rugova ' s credibility in the eyes of many Kosovars. 5,
By early 1997, several other Kosovo Albanian parties
began to emerge from the shadows. Some of which,
especially the second largest party in the region, led by
Adem Demaci, were calling for a more militant approach to
solving their problems. Frustrated that Kosovo did not
feature in the Dayton Accords, because of the continued
economic deterioration of the area, or due to Rugova 's
ineffectual policies, violence in the area has dramatically
increased. Demaci, due to his sympathetic position and the
7 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia
(London: Penguin Books USA, 1996), 384.
58 Malcolm, 354.
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success that the Kosovo Liberation Army enjoyed in the
early months of 1998, became their political
representative
.
B. RISE OF THE KLA AND THE LDK RIFT
Given the level of oppression in Kosovo, and the
independence movements in other parts of the Former
Yugoslavia, it is not surprising that an ethnic Albanian
liberation army has appeared, but that it took so long to
form. However, given the reasons listed above for the loss
of leverage by the LDK, as well as the anarchy in Albania
in the spring of 1997 which created an excellent source. of
weapons for the movement (as many as 800,000 rifles) 59 , the
KLA announced its existence and became a major player in
Kosovar political affairs.
Attacks by the KLA occurred as early as 1993
.
However, they seem to have been isolated incidents and not
coordinated in any way. The first planned assaults,
however, occurred on 22 April 1996 when four almost
simultaneous assaults were launched in separate areas of
5 Jane's Intelligence Review, Ethnic Violence Escalates in
Kosova, 1 February 1998, Vol. 10, No. 2, 13.
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Kosovo. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two Serb
police officers and three wounded. 60
Attacks have continued since then. The most
spectacular attack, which gave the KLA real credibility,
occurred on the night of 10 September 1997, when ten
coordinated operations in locations 150 kms apart targeted
police barracks and vehicles. This series of attacks
proved that there was a well organized, armed movement
which had the knowledge and resources to plan and execute
complex attacks in an area heavily controlled by Serb
military and police forces. 61
In the summer of 1997, the KLA acknowledged its
existence and claimed responsibility for several incidents
in which Serb police were killed in the area, as well as
Kosovo Albanians that had "collaborated" with the Serbs and
their system of government. The list of "collaborators"
include the head of the Socialist Party of Serbia in
Glogovac, and a deputy in the Yugoslav Assembly's House of
Citizens, as well as the deaths of five policemen, five
Serb civilians, and eleven Kosovo Albanians. This use of
50 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 ICG, Kosovo Spring.
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a para-military force in the area may well bring about the
same results as Serb para-military units did in Bosnia. By
attacking collaborators, the KLA is forcing the general
Kosovar population to "choose" sides and arm themselves.
The movement has become sufficiently powerful in the
Drenica region of Kosovo (with Demaci saying that the KLA
has 30,000 men under arms), so that in November 1997, an
armed band was able to force a column of Serbian police
armored vehicles to withdraw from the area. 63
With these limited military successes, a growing rift
has emerged between Rugova and the LDK, and the government-
in-exile, led by Prime Minister Bukoshi . The situation has
degenerated to the point that Bukoshi has declared that
Rugova 's policy of peaceful resistance has brought the
Kosovar movement to a dead-end, and has yielded no positive
results. With Bukoshi' s backing, Demaci has not only
continued to advocate civil disobedience and active
resistance, but has acknowledged the KLA, and has only
asked that they suspend their activities during periods of
negotiations with the Serbs. Rugova, on the other hand,
while holding the purse strings of the three percent
63 ibid.
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levied taxes on the diaspora by virtue of being the leader
of the LDK, continues to deny that the KLA exists and
continues to ask the international community to become
involved in solving Kosovo's problem. 64
Despite the increasing violence in the area, Rugova
has continued to advocate his policy of passive resistance.
But, as events of the last several months have shown, he
may be losing control of his political movement. To date,
all Rugova can show for his efforts is a nine point, U.S.
backed education agreement signed in 1996 that has not yet
been implemented. The growing militancy of the Kosovar
population will continue to increase, especially when they
see that the international community will become more
interested and involved in their plight when violence is
used. Yet, the more violent approach may cause the Kosovar
independence movement to lose its legitimacy, and in the




Given the historical and ethno-national backgrounds of
the Serbian and Kosovar peoples, and what the international
community wants or is willing to tolerate as far as the
eventual status of Kosovo, an analysis of current options
for conflict resolution is needed. While European support
will be required to help resolve the Kosovo crisis, the
United States must play a dominant and active role for
crisis resolution.
In the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, the Europeans and the
U.S. pursued different goals. With regard to economic
sanctions, the Europeans used a "carrot and stick" approach
— more funding to the FRY if Milosevic intervened or used
his influence to get the Bosnian Serbs to sign agreements —
which only made Milosevic more powerful and instrumental in
the peace process. The U.S., on the other hand, used the
economic embargo to undermine the Milosevic regime. The
U.S. and Europe also operated at cross-purposes with the
arms embargo against the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Europeans were against supplying arms to the Bosnian
Muslims because they had their own peacekeeping troops on
the ground under U.N. mandate, and the U.S. was in favor of
"Train and Equip" for the Muslims because they had no
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capacity to produce their own weaponry (while the FRY did)
and the program would eventually even out the decided
advantage that the Bosnian Serbs had in artillery and
tanks
.
It is therefore imperative that the U.S. remains
engaged and takes the lead in crisis resolution
negotiations. Only the U.S. has the ability to coordinate
an overall, coalition strategy among the European nations,
and the military capabilities and firepower that can
influence Milosevic's behavior.
Understanding the history of the conflict, and being
able to "pull the proper levers" at the right time is
critical in order to manipulate and influence the factions.
While the policy options offered assume that airstikes and
other stand off capabilities may be used in an effort to
coerce the parties to find an amicable solution, they do
not assume that NATO or any other foreign military force
will be deployed to Kosovo in order to "keep the peace."
Ample evidence of the failure of this method, as
implemented by the international community after the Dayton
Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina, shows that in cases where
"ancient ethnic hatreds" exist, whether real or perceived,
insertion of international forces in the area will be
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detrimental to long-term conflict resolution. In Bosnia,
the construction of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, served
not only to keep the hostile military forces from coming in
contact with each other, but also served to keep the people
apart and further polarize the hard-line politicians.
Besides, the stand-off military capabilities that the U.S.
and European militaries possess, coupled with the aim of
the policy options listed below, ground forces would not be
required to obtain a peaceful solution.
The Kosovo crisis, if it is ever to be resolved, must
be solved by the Serbians and Kosovars in a way that will
be amenable to both parties . Interaction between the
parties is the only way to build the necessary confidence
building measures. Political will, ethnic and cultural
tolerance, and renewed emphasis toward democratization,
will need to be shared by all parties.
A . LEVERS
Milosevic exercises his authority by means of the
country's financial controls, media, and state security
forces. By attacking these critical nodes in the Milosevic
regime, combined with the loss of nationalism that was
explained earlier, Milosevic will be willing to enter into
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negotiations if he believes he is becoming dangerously
close to losing any more power within the government or
even being overthrown.
Poverty and uncertainty have become a critical factor
in the FRY. Lawlessness, corruption, and a mafia style
economy have become the norm. Milosevic, under this type
of economy, has accumulated enormous wealth that he uses to
control the media, and pay bribes to government, party, and
police officials. His autocratic regime gives him the
power to control the issuance of credits and hard currency
through the Yugoslav National Bank, thereby controlling the
economy. 65 While he has put himself in the unique position
of being in almost complete control of the economy, he has
also created a critical vulnerability for the international
community to exploit."
While general sanctions have limited Milosevic's
capacity to do many things, they have caused the people of
the FRY to rally around the flag, and for the most part
they have been able to get by through timely payments of
pensions and other forms of relief by the Milosevic regime.
Sharper economic sanctions that specifically target
65 David Cortright and George A. Lopez, ed. , Economic Sanctions.
Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 144.
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Milosevic's assets are needed. Freezing his foreign bank
accounts (estimated to be from 200 to 500 million
dollars) 66 , and placing sanctions against commercial
businesses and their subsidiaries that he has interests in,
will greatly affect his ability to control the economy, pay
off his patronage network, and meet the peoples' pension
and wage obligations. This may take several months to be
effective, but if it is done in a coordinated way by the
U.S. and Europeans, it should prove to be decisive.
The same financial lever must be used in order to
downplay the effects of the media in Serbia. Milosevic has
routinely used the media in an effort to fuel the people's
nationalist flames during periods of crisis. He continues
to do it in the case of the current Kosovo crisis in order
to justify sending so many troops and security personnel to
the region. Without the financial means to operate the
media campaign, the people of the FRY will become less
enflamed about the situation in Kosovo, and Milosevic will
lose a cause that he has used to divert their attention
away from their poor economic plight.
Lastly, the Yugoslav army and police forces have become
disenchanted with the Milosevic regime. In the case of the
56 ICG, Serbia - The Milosevic Factor.
55
police forces, they have become disenchanted because they
typically have to wait months to be paid. While being paid
mostly in cash, and about fifty percent more than other
low-skill government workers, many of them are assigned to
the Kosovo area and are away from their families. 67
The army, since the end of the Bosnian war, has become
even more distant than the police from the Milosevic
regime. Many officers are being held accountable for
losses in Bosnia and Croatia, and equipment has not been
maintained or replaced due to the economic situation.
Additionally, many officers and troops have had to
subsidize their incomes by working another job. Milosevic
has had to infiltrate the army with police forces in order
to keep their allegiance, which is deeply resented by the
upper echelons of the military.
General Momcilo Persic, Chief of Staff of the Army,
has lashed out at the policies of the Milosevic regime. In
January 1998, he complained of the Milosevic regime not
doing what it could to have the economic sanctions lifted
from the country. The General has also called for
Yugoslavia to work towards eventual membership in the
Partnership for Peace program and eventual NATO membership.
67 Ibid.
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All of these declarations are clear signs, that while the
army may not be able to directly oppose Milosevic, there is
dissention in the ranks and they are willing to make a deal
with regard to the Kosovo situation. Concrete promises to
the Yugoslav army's high command of financial, technical,
and material support, by the international community should
the Kosovo dispute be settled amicably, will weigh heavily
on Milosevic's mind. 68
In the case of the Kosovars, both the LDK and the KLA
must also be pressured to make a deal. Their pressure
points, like Milosevic's, are centered around money. By
applying overt and covert pressure on the accounts that
send money to the LDK via the three percent levied tax on
the diaspora, Rugova will eventually have to compromise.
Unable to provide basic education and health benefits to
the Kosovar population through their parallel governmental
structures, something the Kosovar population has become
very dependent upon, will cause Rugova to lose even more
influence than he has of late with the emergence of the
KLA. By freezing these accounts, and emphatically stating
that the international community will not allow an
independent Kosovo or Greater Albania, Rugova will be
Ibid.
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increasingly pressured to deal. Conversely, allowing
Rugova access to the funds at appropriate times will
strengthen him in his dealings with the KLA and other hard-
liners, as he is the only one that can manage and
manipulate the parallel Kosovar institutions. Rugova,
having exhibited a more moderate stance on Kosovar
recognition during the early 1990 's, should be willing to
negotiate a peaceful settlement in an effort to retain
power
.
The KLA, while not being as susceptible to monetary
levers, must have their supply of weapons cut off from
neighboring Albania. Due to their fundamentalist views,
they are the least likely party to compromise and present
the biggest threat to a negotiated settlement. A
preventative deployment force along the Albanian border,
much like the one in Macedonia, should effectively cut off
the supply of light weapons, and black market supplies
currently being filtered into the area. Greatly
outnumbered and out gunned by FRY forces, without the
ability to make their own weaponry, the KLA will be forced
to submit or carry on a low level guerrilla war, with ever
decreasing amounts of weapons and ammunition. The latter
situation will soon be realized as only playing into the
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hands of Milosevic and his strategy of maintaining the
status quo.
B. MILOSEVICS MANIPULATION AND UTILITY
However weakened Milosevic may be, he still remains
the only credible interlocutor in Serbia. While many of
the other Serbian party's leaders differ from Milosevic on
many issues, the largest parties are unwilling to give up
Kosovo. The JUL party, Seselj's nationalist party, and the
leaders of the former coalition parties of the 1996
uprisings in Belgrade, remain steadfast nationalists.
Dependence on the anti-Kosovo nationalist fervor would ,be
necessary if any of them came to power, as they have
nothing else to inflame the passions of the people, or any
of the levers that Milosevic holds over the country to
wield power. Unseating Milosevic would place an
ineffectual leader that does not have the power to
influence events or bring stability to the area.
Only Milosevic has control of the media to rally the
people behind an agreement, or the political power via his
domination of party politics and patronage network to push
through the constitutional amendment necessary to change
the status of Kosovo. Milosevic's track record suggests
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that he is willing to respond to pressure, but only if he
perceives that he will lose power. 69
Milosevic is an opportunist that has sacrificed many
of the beliefs and abandoned strategies in the past in
order to maintain power. He has abandoned the Communist
Party and his friend, Ivan Stambolic, as mentioned earlier,
in his effort to become Serbia's leader. When his effort
to become the leader of Yugoslavia failed in 1990, he
channeled his energies into the creation of a Greater
Serbia. And, in 1995, Milosevic signed the Dayton Accords
and the Erdut Agreement, under which he abandoned the
Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs due to the threat of
additional airstikes on Serbian territory, and with the
advancing Federation forces into Bosnian Serb areas in
October 1995, massive refugee flows into Serbia. All of
these events threatened to destabilize Milosevic's control
over Serbia. In the end, he was willing to change course






C. OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS
A lasting solution to the Kosovo crisis will have to
allow for the conflicting views of the Serbs and Kosovars
.
According to a recent poll in Serbia and Montenegro 42 .
percent of the Serbs wished to abolish all autonomy for
Kosovo, while 40.7 percent were prepared to give the
Kosovars limited autonomy. Only 2.2 percent believed that
they had the right to become a republic, and 5.9 percent
advocated partition of the region along Serb and Kosovar
held areas. The Kosovars, on the other hand, were 88.9
percent in favor of independence, and 2 6.9 percent
advocated territorial division and population exchanges
.
It is important to note, however, that over fifty percent
were also willing to return to "autonomous province" status
as guaranteed under the 1974 constitution. 71
In analyzing the below options, it is important to
note that the international community, for all intents and
purposes, has established Kosovo as being a part of
Yugoslavia. The inability of the international community
to come to a common strategic plan for Kosovo during the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the Dayton Peace Accords,
has legitimized it as a FRY internal matter. Decisions
71 ICG, Kosovo Spring.
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made thus far have advocated the ending of human rights
abuses and greater freedom for Kosovars, but they have in
no way advocated the redrawing of existing borders. While
Kosovo may be able to escape from being under the Serbian
government in the short term, it is doubtful that they will
be able or allowed to break away from the FRY.
1 . Status Quo
In the short term, the status quo is the best option
for Serbia. Stoking the nationalist flames of his country
in order to prop up his regime, Milosevic needs the Kosovar
crisis to continue in order to divert attention away from
the country's economic problems. In the long-term,
however, the drain on resources, materiel, and personnel,
will continue to weaken the economy and his leadership.
To both the LDK and the KLA, as well as the
international community, the status quo is an unacceptable
option. Although the KLA has been largely defeated by Serb
forces since their early successes through April 1998, they
will continue to fight as long as there is international
support and funding for their cause . They believe that
eventually the international community will come to their
aid. As for the international community, the large amounts
of refugees and human rights violations in the Kosovo area,
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combined with the possibility of spillover of the conflict
into other ethnic Albanian areas on the Balkan peninsula,
is a situation that they can no longer tolerate.
The status quo option appears to be untenable to both
parties. In the long term it will have a great impact on
the Serb economy, while the Kosovars will become more
radicalized and alienated, leading to large refugee flows
from the area and the possibility of a protracted guerilla
war being waged. 72
2. Independence or Partition
The independence option is the most preferred by the
Kosovo Albanians. While the LDK's position has gone from
the restoration of autonomy to republic status to full
independence (February 1998), the LDK now appears to be
open to international options for the resolution of the
conflict. The KLA, however, remains steadfast in achieving
independence and reserves the right to unify with Albania.
The Serbs denounce this option and they have said that
military force would be used to protect their land,
religious shrines, and Serbian people in the area. The
^European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans and Public
International Law and Policy Group of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Kosovo: From Crisis to a Permanent Solution, 01




international community is unwilling to consider this
proposal, fearing that independence would not only lead to
the possible migration of Serbs from the area, but also the
creation of a Greater Albania and other independence
movements of minorities in the area (e.g., the Vojvodina
Hungarians in northern Serbia, or the Sandzak Muslims in
central Serbia)
.
The idea of partition, similar in its end-state as the
independence option, under which the Serbs would keep the
northern and eastern parts of Kosovo where their religious
shrines and Serb population live, has met with some Serbian
parties approval. Kosovars, however, are unlikely to
approve of such an option. Most of Kosovo's material
wealth (mining) lies in the northern part of the region,
and they in turn would probably ask for the border to be
drawn to include majority held ethnic Albanian areas north
of the border in Serbia. This would be unacceptable to the
Serbs. 73 Furthermore, the international community would not
approve of such an option because of not only the Greater
Albania scenario, but also because of their reluctance to





As stated earlier, the current rise of nationalist
tensions by the Kosovars in Kosovo is largely due to the
revocation of their autonomous status by the Serbs as
guaranteed to them by the 1974 constitution. Prior to
1989, the Kosovars enjoyed the same status as other
republics, including their own legislative apparatus,
financial autonomy, and representation in the federal
parliament, constitutional court, and presidency. However,
the Serbs rejected this constitution because they believed
and still believe that the Kosovars, while being largely
supported by them economically and financially, had too
much say in the federal government and offered little to
the other republics
.
While the Kosovar position has intensified since the
beginning of 1998, it is likely that they would accept this
option as a starting and interim point for long-term
negotiations. The Serb position may soften, and given the
events of the last year, prefer this option if they are
able to avoid more of the financial responsibility and aid
to Kosovo, rather than establishing an international
protectorate in the area or giving them republic status.
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4.
Improvement Of Human Rights
Improving the human rights conditions in Kosovo, which
would include ending police repression, institution of the
education agreement, re-employing Kosovars in government
and public positions, and allowing international monitoring
agencies to operate in the area, would be the least costly
option available to the Serbs. While the Serbian
government has rejected this proposal, in that they have
the right to combat "terrorist" forces within their borders
by all means available, one of the former coalition parties
of 1996, the Civic Alliance of Serbia, has indicated that
it is in favor of this arrangement. 74 While in favor of
regional autonomy and equal rights for all citizens, this
proposal in the long-term does not solve the question of
Kosovo's constitutional status. Kosovars, while in favor
of this option as an interim framework to promote broader
dialogue, will only accommodate the option if guarantees
are reached for a long-term, permanent status of Kosovo.
5. Republic
Giving Kosovo equal, republic status in the FRY, while
keeping the borders of the FRY intact, is the toughest
option to implement. For the Serbs, not only will they
74 Ibid.
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have to give up some of their federal superiority to
another republic, but also have to deal with other
nationalist movements in the Vojvodina and the Sandzak that
would in turn request the same treatment. Also the Serbs
would have to have concrete guarantees for the safety of
the Serb population in Kosovo. While this republic status
would be ideal and receive approval from most Kosovars, the
international community in the short-term should avoid this
option in that it could empower other nationalities within
Serbia and Macedonia, to ask for the same treatment. It
should also be avoided because Kosovo under this
arrangement would have its own constitution, legislature,
and veto power in the federal government. Considering the
current poor relationship between the Kosovars and Serbs,
the FRY government would fail to work under this
arrangement. Federal voting would be along ethnic lines,
much the way it was done in the 1980 's in the Former
Yugoslavia, leading to political stagnation and
ineffectiveness. Constitutionally, the Kosovars would then
have the right to secede leading to the same problems of




While republic status may be a long-term solution, it
will require time for both sides to back down from their
current hard-line positions and to develop the necessary
confidence building measures before the republic option can




The final solution to the dispute in Kosovo must be
left for the Serbs and the Kosovars to decide. However,
international assistance and pressure, and even more so,
adherence to a strategic plan, will be crucial in achieving
a lasting and peaceful solution. Pressure will be needed
to bring the parties to the negotiating table, and then
again in order for them to make a deal
.
So far, the disunity of the international community
has wasted valuable time in an effort to solve a problem
that has been brewing in its modern context since 1990. In
the most current wave of violence to sweep the region,
beginning in December 1997, it took the Contact Group until
9 March 1998 before there was a call for an arms embargo. 7
The fall of the Albanian government and the dispersal of
many of their army's arms caches in 1996 should have been
an early warning to the conflicts escalating violence. The
Contact Group's key demand of ending the violence in the
region and for the factions to enter into a dialogue with
no preconditions, has not been met. Since then, the
' U.S. Department of State, Kosovo Home Page, Recent Agreements,
accessed 25 October 1998; available from
http •. / /www. state . gov /www/ regions /eur/koscvo_hr; . html ; Internet
.
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international community has made threats to further
"internationalize the measures, and to pursue a freeze on
funds held abroad" but have not been able to achieve any
agreement or compliance among themselves for its
implementation. 7 Milosevic, sensing the discord within the
international community, has continued to pursue his
objectives in the region, which by October 1998 were
largely attained in that he had recaptured all areas and
cities in Kosovo that were reported to be held by the KLA.
As of the beginning of October, the current fighting has
caused the evacuation of over 300,000 refugees from the
area before there was a decisive and believable call by the
United States for NATO forces to be ready to conduct
airstrikes in the area and the possible implementation of a
47,000 man force for peacekeeping purposes. Since then,
there has been a gradual reduction of Serbian police forces
in the region. 78 However, the U.S. element of the Kosovo
Diplomatic Observer Mission reports continued cease-fire
violations in the Kosovo area, and even artillery shelling
(not clear whose) in the Drenica region. They have also
77 ICG, Milosevic : The Invisible Hand.
78 Steven Erlanger, Serbs Warned: End Violence in Kosovo, New York
Times News Service, 2 October 1998.
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observed that Serbian forces have not withdrawn enough
forces from the area, which led Ambassador Hill (U.S.
Ambassador to Macedonia) on 22 October 1998 to say that,
"We are not satisfied with the level of Serbian
compliance." As of 25 October 1998, SACEUR was scheduled
to meet with Milosevic to demand full compliance with the
terms set in the Holbrooke-Milosevic negotiations. 7
B . RECOMMENDATION
As these most recent events illustrate, the United
States must lead the effort for conflict resolution in
Kosovo. While most European nations continue to have a
soft stance against Milosevic (the carrot and stick
approach to negotiating) , and Milosevic expertly continues
to string out the international communities' demands and
manipulate the situation in order to maintain the status
quo, only the U.S. has been able to influence recent events
with diplomatic and military overtures.
The following is a recommendation for the best course
of action in order to bring the various factions to the
negotiating table (short-term solution)
. While the time
5 U.S. Department of State, Kosovo Home Page, KDOM Daily report
and Kosovo Progress Report of 22 October 1998.
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table for the below actions to be effective may vary with
international community support and other factors, the
order in which they are used is critical so that various
factions will be undermined or empowered at the proper
time
.
1 . The Serbs
• First, the U.S. and NATO must position forces and
threaten the use of airstrikes on military and
police forces engaged in attacks against the Kosovo
population. Aircraft equipped to jam communications
should begin SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense)
missions over Kosovo in an effort to cut-off
communications between Belgrade and units deployed
to the region. Milosevic will be unwilling to
sustain heavy losses in the field for fear that the
military will no longer support him. This must also
be the first step from the international
communities' point of view in order to stop the
fighting in the area, and to alleviate the refugee
flow and humanitarian crisis in the area.
• Secondly, all accounts held by Milosevic and the FRY
government outside its borders should be frozen.
IMF "outer wall" sanctions have hurt the Milosevic
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regime, but not enough. The international community
must attack Milosevic's source of power — money —
which allows him to operate his political and media
machine. Loss of popular support, inability to pay
pensions to the people etc., will undermine his
authority in the FRY, and cause him to enter
negotiations before his power base erodes.
2 . The Kosovars
• With the recent developments in Albania, including
riots and another change of government, inform the
Kosovar leaders (both LDK and KLA) that Albania has
not recognized Kosovo's independence or as a
parallel state in the past, and with their current
problems, the likelihood of recognition, or even
support, is decreasing. 80 Lack of Albanian
government interest in the Kosovars plight, Serb
superiority in balance of forces, and international
community non-acceptance of the possibility of a
"Greater Albania, " should alert Kosovar leaders to
the fact that they must enter negotiations and move
away from their hard-line stance.
3 European Action Council
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• With Albanian permission, the U.S. and NATO should
deploy a preventative force along the Kosovar
border. Like UNPREDEP in Macedonia, this force
would prevent illegal weapons and black marketeering
from entering Kosovo . The Albanians in the current
situation would probably approve of such a
stabilizing force on their territory. This overt
action would greatly decrease the KLA's ability to
wage war. Kosovo will be effectively contained, and
Serb superiority in balance of forces will obviously
put down any future insurrectionist movements . The
hard-line stance of the KLA will be greatly
undermined. Their position can be even further
undermined by allowing funding to enter the region
to help rebuild the infrastructure and economy of
Kosovo, only after they have come to the negotiating
table, and only through moderate LDK organization
and parallel structure of government.
• While the above listed action will effectively
disable the KLA fighting force and empower the more
moderate LDK, it will be important to remind the LDK
that they are not in a position either to make
excessive demands. The LDK must be informed that
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unless they come to the negotiating table, accounts
that are currently transferring funds to the LDK's
parallel government institutions will be frozen.
Rugova, fearing loss of power and international
community to support, will quickly comply and assume
a more moderate stance at the negotiating table.
While the factions may not come to the negotiating
table immediately after the implementation of the above
measures by the international community, over time they
will erode each of their power bases. As each faction
begins to feel that it is losing power over its respective
institutions, and diplomatic pressures are increased by the
United States and the international community, they will
come to the negotiating table without pre-conditions.
Both sides at the negotiating table should be expected
to retain hard-line policies. However, continued pressure
applied by the international community will eventually
bring about an agreement whereby each side must give. In
this vane, it seems the most likely option in the short-
term would be for the Serbs to declare Kosovo an autonomous
province. It is middle ground for both sides, and would
not entail the redrawing of borders which the international
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community seems unwilling to do. While the Kosovars and
many people in the international community would like to
see Kosovo attain republic status within the FRY in the
long-term, confidence building measures must first be
established and mutual trust among the ethnicities attained
for it to be successful.
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